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ABSTRACT 
The two principal smoking-related state legislative activities stand in sharp contrast to one another. 
Cigarette excise taxation diffused among  the states well before the connection between smoking and illness 
became a public issue, yet more recent tax increases appear to reflect a response to the national anti-smoking 
campaign.  The growing disparity in cigarette prices between tobacco and other states has created a lucrative 
market in bootlegged cigarettes and has thereby brought  new taxat ion to a virtual standstill for six years. 
Laws restricting smoking in public places represent a phenomenon  of the 1970's clearly bearing the imprint 
of the ant i -smoking campaign.  F rom 1972 through 1978, the number  of states with such laws in effect grew 
from 5 to 36, and the restrictiveness of the laws also increased. The dramatic correlation between diffusion 
of the laws and decreases in cigarette consumpt ion rates seems best interpreted as each of these reflecting 
changes in social attitudes toward smoking. 
Introduction 
Public awareness of the health consequences of cigarette smoking dates from the 
appearance of a few articles on the subject in popular magazines in the early 1950's 
(e.g., Norr, 1952; Lieb, 1953; Miller and Monahan,  1954). Publication of the Surgeon 
General's Report on Smoking and Health in 1964 (U.S. DHEW, 1964) initiated a 
series of sustained if diverse efforts, often called the "anti-smoking campaign," to 
inform the public and encourage individuals to cease smoking, or at least to adopt less 
hazardous smoking behaviors. A series of major surveys demonstrates that the 
educational function has realized considerable success: sizable majorities of smokers 
and nonsmokers alike now understand both the general and specific health 
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consequences of smoking, and attitudes clearly have moved in the "anti-smoking" 
direction (U.S. DHEW, 1969, 1973, 1976). Indicators of smoking behaviors also 
suggest a meaningful behavioral response: the percentage of adult Americans who 
smoke has fallen significantly (from 42% in 1965 to roughly a third today); annually, 
smokers are selecting cigarettes with lower tar and nicotine content (U.S. DHEW, 
1979); and'the campaign has averted anticipated increases in both the percentage of 
smokers and daily per-smoker consumption rates, to the point that, in the absence of 
the campaign, per capita cigarette consumption might have been 40% higher than it is 
at present (Warner, 1977 and in press). 
The diversity of the efforts comprising the anti-smoking campaign is reflected in the 
diversity of the actors in the drama. In the private sector, the campaign has made 
strange bedfellows of the major voluntary societies, commercial interests peddling 
aids to smoking cessation (from pills to special filters to quit-smoking classes), and 
even the tobacco companies themselves, the latter engaging in research on less 
hazardous cigarettes and heavily promoting their lower tar and nicotine products. 
In the public sector, governments at all levels have adopted numerous measures 
having the effect, direct or indirect, of restricting smoking. Most conspicuous have 
been the activities of the federal government in both the bureaucracy and the 
Congress. The  latter has passed laws regulating the promotion of tobacco (e.g., 
package and advertisement labelling requirements and the broadcast ad ban) 
(Friedman, 1975), while the former has relied on publicity surrounding release of 
HEW reports and survey findings. Reinvigoration of the federal anti-smoking 
campaign occurred in January, 1978, when then-HEW Secretary Califano announced 
formation of the Office on Smoking and Health and an infusion of new resources into 
smoking research and education (Califano, 1978). Two new Surgeon General's 
Reports have followed, the first, released on the fifteenth anniversary of the 1964 
Report, serving as a compendium of knowledge acquired over the years (U.S. DHEW, 
1979), the second focusing on issues specific to smoking by women (U.S. DHEW, 
1980). 
The two principal smoking-related legislated activities of the states have been 
cigarette excise taxation, a function begun in Iowa in 1921 and performed by all of the 
states since 1969, and the restriction of smoking in public places ("nonsmokers' rights" 
laws), a relatively new concern reflected in the existence of laws on the books of 36 
states as of 1978. (Prior to 1971, only five states had passed relevant laws.) Obviously, 
each of these policies has diffused widely, though at very different times and for quite 
different reasons. The purpose of this paper is to examine and compare the trends in 
these policies, their relationships to the anti-smoking campaign, and their effects on 
cigarette consumption. Washington remains the publicity center of the anti-smoking 
campaign, but the new "nonsmokers' rights" laws have shifted the locus of important 
legislative activity to the states. The influential Washington tobacco lobby and 
Congressional voting bloc have long constrained the development of federal smoking- 
and-health policy (Fritchler, 1969); by contrast, state legislatures outside of the 
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tobacco belt do not confront comparable tobacco interests. Hence, both political logic 
and current legislative activism suggest that the shift toward the states in smoking- 
and-health initiatives may remain in force for many years to come. Given this 
possibility, it seems constructive to examine the nature and significance of the 
principal state responses to smoking to date. 
The next section of this paper discusses cigarette excise taxation by the states. The 
following section considers the "nonsmokers' rights" movement as it is reflected in the 
passage of smoking-restriction legislation in the states. The concluding section 
compares and contrasts these two principal areas of state cigarette smoking policy [1, 
2]. 
Excise Taxation 
Historically, clearly it would be inappropriate to label cigarette excise taxation an 
anti-smoking policy. To be sure, many legislators may have viewed smoking as a vice 
which should be penalized and discouraged, but others correctly perceived a revenue 
potential in taxing cigarettes [3]. Beginning in 1921, the growth in the number of states 
taxing cigarettes followed a conventional diffusion pattern (Fig. 1) [4]. Over half of the 
states imposed a cigarette tax by 1940 and all but three states taxed cigarettes by 1964, 
the year of the first Surgeon General's Report. 
If cigarette excise taxation originally had been an anti-smoking policy, one would 
expect measures of early excise taxation to diverge significantly between the major 
tobacco-pr0ducing states (North Carolina, Kentucky, South Carolina, Virginia, 
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the year of a state's first enactment of a cigarette tax, there is no difference between the 
six major tobacco states (average year = 1939) and the remaining states (average = 
1940) [5]. Similarly, prior to the first widespread publicity linking smoking to illness in 
the early 1950's, the average number of tax increases per state (including first 
enactments) was identical (equal to 1.0) for both the tobacco and other states. Finally, 
at that tifne the average rate of per-package taxation did not differ substantially 
between the tobacco (2.5c) and other states (2.88c). 
The latter two measures began to diverge, however, as the anti-smoking campaign 
heated up (See Table 1). From 1953 through 1963 - from the first smoking-illness 
publicity to the year prior to the Surgeon General's Report - tobacco states averaged 
only 1.0 tax increases per state (again, including original enactments), while other 
states averaged 1.6. The gap widened in the post-Surgeon General's Report era, with 
tobacco states adding an average of 1.3 tax increases from 1964 through 1979 and 
other states adding double the figure, 2.6 [6]. Corresponding to this, the gap in average 
tax rates grew considerably. In 1963, tobacco states' taxes averaged 3.75c per pack (a 
50% increase from the 1950 rate), while those of other states averaged 5.28c (an 83% 
increase). By 1979, the tobacco state average was 6.75c (80% greater than in 1963) and 
that of other states 13.58c (157% higher than in 1963) [7, 8]. 
The growth in excise taxation has not been spread out evenly over the years of the 
anti-smoking campaign. The nine years following issuance of the original Surgeon 
General's Report saw an unprecedented flurry of excise tax activity, with states 
averaging close to 12 excise tax increases per year (and the number of local 
governments imposing an excise tax rising from 225 to 378). Beginning in 1973, 
however, new tax legislation slowed dramatically. From that year through the end of 
the decade, states averaged under three increases per year. The abruptness and extent 
of the decrease in new state taxation may be understood more vividly by observing 
that in six of the nine years from 1964 through 1972, state tax increases numbered in 
"double figures," i.e., in excess of 10 per year, while the largest number in a later year 
was six (in 1978). In addition, in five of the seven years from 1973 through 1979, the 
Table 1 
Excise Taxation by the States 
Average Number  of Tax 
Period Increases Per State* 
Average Rate of Per-Pack 
Taxation (end of period) (c) 
6 Tobacco States Other States 6 Tobacco States Other States 
1921 1952 1.0 1.0 2.50 2.88 
1953-1963 1.0 1.6 3.75 5.28 
1964 1979 1.3 2.6 6.75 13.58 
* Includes first enactments.  
Source: Tobacco Tax Council, 1979. 
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Table 2 
Number of States with Tax Increases (Decreases), By Year 
No. of States with No. of States with 
Year Increases (Decreases) Year Increases (Decreases) 
1951 4 1966 18 
1952 4 (2) 1967 4 (1) 
1953 0 1968 14 
1954 3 1969 8 
1955 5 1970 17 
1956 12 1971 13 
1957 3 (1) 1972 13 
1958 8 1973 2 
1959 8 1974 2 
1960 13 1975 5 
1961 6 1976 2 
1962 12 (1) 1977 2 
1963 9 1978 6 
1964 11 1979 1 (1) 
1965 8 
Source: Tobacco Tax Council, 1979, Table 7. 
number of increases equaled only one or two. Prior to 1973, one has to go back 20 
years to 1953 to find a year with fewer than three increases (See Table 2). 
The principal reason for the deceleration in the rate of tax increases appears to have 
been recognition that interstate cigarette bootlegging was becoming a problem of 
considerable magnitude (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
1977). Differences in state tax rates account for almost all of the variation in cigarette 
retail prices among the states. Prices of cigarettes in the lowest-tax states (North 
Carolina, Virginia, and Kentucky each impose a state tax of from 2-3 cents per pack of 
cigarettes) run more than 20 cents less per pack than those of the highest-tax states [9]. 
It has been estimated that a single truckload of bootlegged cigarettes can generate 
$20,000 or more in smuggling profits (The Washington Post, 1978). Overall, high-tax 
states are estimated to lose from $400 to $500 million in tax revenues each year due to 
bootlegging (The Economist, 1978; Advisory Commission, 1977). The consequence, 
of course, is that state legislatures are unwilling to raise excise taxes and thereby 
increase the smuggling-inducing price differential. In fact, discussion of tax decreases 
has occurred in certain high-tax states, the assumption being that a lowered 
differential would decrease bootlegging sufficiently to outweigh the smaller tax rate, 
and hence that tax revenues would increase [10]. 
Regardless of the reasons for fluctuations in tax-increase legislative activity, the 
changes undoubtedly have influenced cigarette consumption rates. Demand for 
cigarettes is price-inelastic but the elasticity is nonzero; that is, changes in real cigarette 
prices will affect aggregate consumption. Given that cigarette production generally is 
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considered a constant-cost industry, real changes in cigarette price are largely 
attributable to changes in tax rates. Hence the fluctuations in state tax trends can be 
translated into probable consumption impacts by estimating changes in demand 
attributable to real price changes. Elsewhere, I have attempted this (Warner, in press). 
I concluded that the rapid growth in taxation through 1972 served to depress growth in 
cigarette consumption, while the post-1972 near-cessation in new taxation, which 
lowered the real price of cigarettes [11], should have stimulated consumption. 
Numerically, I estimated that by 1972, adult per capita cigarette consumption, 
which then totaled 4115, would have been higher by over 630 cigarettes (15%) had 
cigarette prices (i.e., taxes) increased only at the general rate of inflation. By 
comparison, the consumption-depressing effects of anti-smoking publicity per se 
totaled only slightly over 400 cigarettes per capita (10% of actual consumption). In 
1978, however, the rapid growth of tax increases through 1972, then the rapid 
deceleration for the remainder of the decade, had shrunk the net effect of price changes 
to 200 cigarettes per capita, or only 5% of that year's actual consumption rate of 3889. 
Again by comparison, anti-smoking publicity accounted for a consumption decrease 
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of 1450 cigarettes per capita, well over a third of the actual rate. In other words, by the 
end of the decade, anti-smoking era fluctuations in cigarette tax and price trends had 
only a minor influence on cigarette consumption, but that minor influence reflected 
the averaging of a considerable depressing impact through the 1960's and early 1970's 
and a significant consumption-inducing effect through the remainder of the decade of 
the 1970's [12]. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the effects of the price fluctuations for the years following the 1964 
Surgeon General's Report. The solid line traces actual annual adult per capita 
cigarette consumption (CIGCAPt). The middle (dashed) line traces the per capita 
consumption path which would have been expected in the absence of the anti-smoking 
publicity, but assuming that the actual pattern of taxation (and hence prices) would 
have occurred even though the anti-smoking publicity had not. The top (dotted) line 
estimates the consumption path expected in the absence of the campaign, but now 
assuming that the relative cigarette price did not change much from its 1963 level. That 
is, I have attributed the rapid growth in taxation from 1964-1972 to the campaign and 
have assumed that, in the absence of the campaign, a steady pattern of tax increases 
(and prices) would have been realized. Thus, the gap between the two top lines 
represents an estimate of the consumption-depressing effects of campaign-induced 
taxation. 
In summation, state excise taxation of cigarettes - obviously a potential weapon in 
the anti-smoking effort - arose in an era which was not especially hostile toward 
smoking. More recent differences between tobacco and other states in tax-increase 
activity do seem consistent with a growing concern about the hazards of smoking, but 
the evidence cannot be considered definitive that states view taxation as an 
appropriate and effective weapon against smoking. To some extent, the problem of 
interstate bootlegging has made the issue moot; new state tax increases have been few 
in number since 1972, and anti-bootlegging tax decreases have been under considera- 
tion in high-tax states. 
Regardless of the motivation for states' increasing taxes, the activity clearly has had 
an impact on cigarette comsumption rates. Through 1972, rapid increases in state 
taxes had a significant depressing effect on consumption, while the recent moratorium 
on tax increases has decreased the real relative price of cigarettes and thereby created 
an inducement for more smoking to occur. Indeed, the steady decrease in per capita 
cigarette consumption since the early 1970's is particularly impressive in light of this 
economic incentive for smoking to increase (Warner, 1981). 
"Nonsmokers' Rights" Laws: The Restriction of Smoking in Public Places 
The second major area of smoking-related state legislative activity - passage of 
"nonsmokers'  rights" laws - stands in striking contrast to excise taxation in several 
dimensions: timing, motivation and effect. While excise taxation flourished before the 
smoking-and-health issue arose, nonsmokers'  rights legislation is a phenomenon of 
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the 1970's; indeed, the diffusion of such legislation among the states "took off" only 
when new excise taxation activity had leveled off in the early 1970's. Recent laws 
restricting smoking in public places bear a distinctive "anti-smoking" or"nonsmokers '  
rights" imprint, while the motivation underlying tax increases is more of a mixed bag. 
Finally, regardless of their motivation, tax increases (or their absence) can be 
identified with impacts on cigarette consumption rates, but the effects of the new 
restrictive laws on smoking behavior remain a subject of conjecture. Indeed, as is 
discussed below, there is some reason ro believe that the new laws are reflecting 
behavior change, rather than producing it. 
State-legislated restrictions on smoking in public places are not exclusively a 
legislative innovation of the 1970's, but the number and restrictiveness of pre-1970 
laws are surprisingly limited. Vermont put the first such law on the books in 1892, 
prohibiting smoking in any place in which the owner, agent, occupant, or custodian 
had posted no-smoking signs. Smoking-restriction legislation "diffused" to Vermont's 
neighbor, New Hampshire, 57 years la ter  (1949) when the Granite State restricted 
smoking in public transportation. Five years passed (1954) before a third New 
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Fig. 3: Diffusion among the states of legislated restrictions on smoking in public places. 
Sources: Unpublished data supplied by the Tobacco Merchants Association and the Tobacco Institute. 
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England state, Maine, joined the ranks. Only two other states passed relevant 
legislation in nearly two decades dating from the first public discussion of the 
connection between smoking and illness: in 1967, Michigan became the first state 
outside of New England to pass smoking-restriction legislation, and that law only 
prohibited smoking in elevators; a year later, Massachusetts became the fourth New 
England state to put smoking restriction on the books, with a law relating to smoking 
in public transportation. 
Despite this slow start, smoking-restriction legislation diffused rapidly through the 
1970's. Beginning in !972, the number of states with relevant legislation in effect grew 
to 36 by the end of 1978; nine, followed by eight new states joined the ranks in 1975 and 
1976, respectively. As a consequence, the U.S. adult population residing in states with 
smoking-restriction laws rose from 8.1% in 1971 to 72.3% in 1978. As with excise 
taxation, the diffusion pattern is the conventional S-shaped one [13] (See Fig. 3). 
In addition to th e simple diffusion of states with legislation, the restrictiveness of laws 
passed grew over time [14]. All of the five pre-1970's laws were only minimally 
restrictive. Of 13 laws passed from 1972 through 1974, eight were minimally 
restrictive, five moderately restrictive, and none highly restrictive. By contrast, of 37 
new laws dating from 1975 through 1978, 10 were minimally restrictive, 17 moderately 
restrictive, and 10 highly restrictive. Table 3 presents data on the diffusion of new laws 
over time and the average restrictiveness per law per year. 
That smoking-restriction laws should be associated with the anti-smoking cam- 
paign is beyond question. A principal concern, perhaps the major theme, of the 
Table 3 
New Annual State Smoking-Restriction Legislation- 
Number and Average Restrictiveness 
Average 
Year(s) No. of new laws Restrictiveness* 
1892-1971 5 0,33 
1972 3 0,33 
1973 3 0.44 
1974 7 0.52 
1975 17 0.65 
1976 5 0.60 
1977 11 0.76 
1978 4 0.67 
* The restrictiveness weights were set arbitrarily as 
follows: minimally restrictive = 0.33, moderately restric- 
tive = 0.67, and highly restrictive = 1.00. 
Sources: Unpublished data supplied by the Tobacco 
Merchants Association and the Tobacco !nstitute and 
author's calculations. 
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campaign in the 1970's was the protection of the rights of nonsmokers [15]. In the early 
half of the decade, this concern arose in large part from evidence that "second-hand", 
"involuntary", or "passive" smoking - inhalation by nonsmokers of the smoke from 
smokers' cigarettes -- could be hazardous to the health of non-smokers; hence the push 
for legislation restricting smoking in public places. In more recent years, the physical 
health hazards of passive smoking were deemphasized - some evidence suggested that 
those hazards were serious only for individuals with significant allergies, respiratory 
and circulatory problems and the like (U.S. DHEW, 1979) - and the nonsmokers' 
rights movement took on more of an ethicai tone: the question became, "simply", one 
of whose rights to clean air - smokers' or nonsmokers'  - should dominate (Axel-Lute, 
1978). New evidence linking regular passive smoking to physical impairment 
comparable to that of light smokers may reintroduce the health-effects theme (White 
and Froeb, 1980). 
The link between support of nonsmokers'  rights and passage of state laws is logical, 
clear and direct. It is reflected in the fact that by the end of 1978 only two of the six 
tobacco states (33%) had passed any smoking-restriction legislation, while 34 of the 45 
other states (75%) had such legislation on the books [16, 17]. 
Ostensibly, the purpose behind the nonsmokers' rights laws was not to reduce the 
amount  of smoking per se, but rather to protect nonsmokers from the irritation of 
involuntary exposure to smoke. Nevertheless, one might expect that smoking- 
restriction lgws, particularly the highly restrictive ones, would force a reduction in 
total cigarette consumption, simply because smokers would be prohibited from 
smoking in unavoidable designated places. Unfortunately, analysis of this phenomenon 
has been extremely limited to date. One study comparing states' consumption rates did 
not identify an impact (Bloom, 1979) and my own aggregate time series study proved 
inadequate to the analytical task (Warner, 1981). The question may never be 
resolved, though other state cross-sectional analyses or disaggregated microeconomic 
consumption survey studies might identify such an effect. 
It is interesting, however, to note the high correlation between the growth in 
smoking-restriction legislation in the aggregate and the recent national decline in per 
capita consumption rates (Warner, 1981). The latter has occurred in each of the last 
six years, the first-time in the century that per capita consumption fell more than three 
consecutive years [18]. The correlation between legMation growth and consumption 
decline is so great that it is not logical to attribute the latter to the physical and 
temporal barriers to smoking imposed by the laws. Rather, my interpretation of the 
correlation is that the consumption declines reflect a behavioral response to the 
entirety of the anti-smoking campaign, a response which has lagged knowledge and 
attitudinal changes by several years (U.S. DHEW 1969, 1973, 1976). Growth in the 
legislation serves simply as a good gauge of a growing public nonsmoking sentiment in 
general and, in particular, political activism by advocates of nonsmokers' rights. In 
short, passage of the laws seems to be a reflection of social values, rather than a creator 
of them [19]. 
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Conclusion 
The two principal state legislative activities relating to smoking and health stand in 
sharp contrast to one another. The one which clearly seems to have affected cigarette 
consumption - excise taxation - was not intended originally to serve as an anti- 
smoking weapon. Ironically, its more enthusiastic application in the nontobacco 
states in the early years of the national anti-smoking campaign, possibly as an 
anti-smoking tactic, helped to create the large price disparities among states which 
have promoted a lucrative trade in interstate cigarette smuggling. Such bootlegging 
has contributed to a rapid drop in the rate of new excise taxation in recent years. 
Consequently real relative cigarette prices have fallen continuously since 1972. While a 
variety of educational and publicity efforts is directed at reducing smoking, decline in 
this basic economic variable serves to encourage smoking. This may be particularly 
true among groups such as the young and poor, who seem most responsive to the 
direct cost of smoking. 
By contrast, the profusion of state smoking-restrition laws reflects the direct 
political activism of anti-smoking forces. A phenomenon of the 1970's, such laws 
legislate the protection, and the rights, of nonsmokers. But they may very well result 
from, rather than direct, the social milieu regarding smoking. The consumption 
impact of smoking-restriction laws remains to be established, but it seems plausible 
that their direct impact will remain small compared to that of their legislative 
predecessors. 
Regardless of the laws' direct effects on consumption, their number, variety, and 
increasingly comprehensive coverage emphasize the potential for anti-smoking 
legislative activity at the state level. For both the present and the foreseeable future, 
political factors will severely constrain such activity at the federal level. Thus, if new 
types of smoking-related legislation are to emerge, the states seem a likely forum and 
the nonsmokers' rights movement a likely model for their evolution and diffusion. 
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1 Emphasis is placed on the word "principal" because most states also have other smoking-related policies 
on their books. For example, the vast majority of states require some health education on smoking in all 
school districts (American School Health Association, 1979). Most such requirements are vague in their 
definition and often extremely limited in their implementation. A few states are at tempting to evolve 
more comprehensive policy approaches to smoking. For example, in Michigan a Citizens' Panel on 
Smoking and Health, appointed by the Governor,  has developed a package of policy recommendat ions  
for implementation in the State. 
2 While this paper will focus on state policies, it should be emphasized that numerous local governments 
have adopted policies of their own. For example,  in 1979, 348 cities and 17 counties imposed excise taxes 
on cigarettes. Note, however, that all but 27 of these local taxes were concentrated in two states, 
Alabama and Missouri, with the remaining 27 scattered among  five other states (see Table 16, Tobacco 
Tax Council, 1979). Concerning the restriction of smoking in public places, scores of local governments 
have relevant ordinances in effect. 
3 Virtually all empirical studies of the demand for cigarettes have found that demand is price inelastic, 
with a "consensus" estimate of  elasticity in the vicinity of -0 .4  to -0.5 (Lyon and Spruill, 1977; Coate and 
Lewit, 1980). This means  that  a I0% increases in price would decrease demand 4-5%. Hence increase in 
tax rates can be expected to increase tax revenues. 
4 While the shape of the interstate diffusion pattern was conventional, the order in which states adopted 
the cigarette excise tax did not follow the general pattern of "innovativeness" among  the states. I 
regressed the date of a state's first enactment  of an excise tax against Walker's calculation of the state's 
"composite innovation score" (Walker, 1969, Table 1) and found no significant relationship; indeed, 
there was a small but near-significant correlation in the theoretically wrong direction. 
5 Ironically, if one excludes the last state to adopt a cigarette excise tax, North Carolina, the average year 
of enactment  of the remaining five tobacco states, 1933, falls considerably earlier than the average of all 
other states. 
6 Since 1950, the six tobacco states have also legislated four tax decreases, compared with only three for 
the other 45 states (including the District of Columbia). 
7 Due to the small total number  of tax laws, neither the change in differences in numbers of tax increases 
or tax rates is statistically significant. However, the numbers  are certainly consistent with theoretical 
expectations and can be viewed as suggestive evidence. 
8 It is interesting to observe that the federal cigarette per-pack excise tax has not changed from 8c since 
1952. As a consequence, the federal tax share of average retail price has dropped during that period from 
over 35% to 13%. Failure of the federal tax to increase is a reflection of the aforementioned strength of 
the tobacco presence in Washington politics. 
9 Connecticut,  Florida and Massachusetts  impose a 21-cent per-package tax, with retail price averaging 
67 70 cents. A few other states have lower state taxes but equally high retail prices due to municipal 
taxes. Most  notable is New York, in which a state tax of 15 cents is supplemented in New York City by a 
municipal tax which generated over $63 million in 1979 (Tobacco Tax Council, 1979). 
10 It is interesting to speculate on the effects of inflation on smuggling in recent years. General price 
inflation has decreased the real value of the differential between high- and low-tax states, while the rising 
cost of fuel has increased the cost of bootlegging. If bootlegging had reached its equilibrium level a few 
years ago, inflation should have decreased the amount  of bootlegging. There are no data available to 
address this question directly, but states identified as the major victims of bootlegging in the mid-1970's 
(Advisory Commission on lntergovernmental Relations, 1977) have experienced relatively greater 
revenue growth than the states benefiting from bootlegging (comparing states with no tax rate changes). 
This is suggestive of a decrease in smuggling activity. 
11 The price of cigarettes is a function of the costs of production and distribution and taxes. If production 
and distribution costs rise at a rate consistent with other prices (i.e., average inflation) but taxes do not 
increase, the net effect is a decrease in the price of cigarettes relative to the general price level. An index of 
real cigarette price - i.e., the price of cigarettes relative to the general consumer price level (with the index 
set equal to 100 in 1967) - rose from 92.70 in 1963 to 107.98 in 1972 and then fell rapidly to 92.02 in 1978. 
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12 All of these estimates are based on a price elasticity of demand of 0.37, estimated at the means of 
dependent and independent variables in the regression analysis reported in my recent paper (Warner, 
1981). Obviously, lower or higher elasticity estimates would alter the number, but the qualitative story 
would not be affected. 
13 Unlike excise taxation, the order (date) in which states adopted smoking-restriction legislation did 
correlate significantly (p = 0.01) with Walker's "composite innovation scores" for the states. That is, the 
early adopters of smoking-restriction legislation tended to be the more legislatively innovative states in 
general (Walker, 1969). Note, however, that this conclusion is statistically sensitive to the treatment of 
early adopters and nonadopters. In order not to weight unduly the positions of Vermont and the other 
four pre-1970 adopters, each of these five states was arbitrarily assigned a "starting" date of 1971, the 
year before any other states implemented relevant legislation. Similarly, in order to include 
nonadopters, they were assigned an "adoption date" of 1980. When both the nonadopters and very early 
adopters were excluded from the analysis, the significant correlation disappeared. 
14 Determination of the restrictiveness of a law required subjective judgments. In general, laws were rated 
as minimally restrictive if they refer to only a limited number of sites in which people spend relatively 
little time (e.g., elevators or public transportation). By contrast, a highly restrictive law is one with broad 
coverage and / or inclusion of sites populated by large numbers of people for significant periods of time 
(e.g., work places, public buildings, stores). 
While the classification of individual laws is subjective, I attempted a classification by myself and then 
compared my results with those prepared by the Tobacco Merchants Association (Bloom, 1979). In the 
few instances in which discrepancies existed, I discussed them with an analyst at the Association and, 
when appropriate, adjusted my classification. Despite the subjectivity of the process, our classifications 
were remarkably consistent. 
It should be emphasized that "restrictiveness" is assessed independent of enforcement. Few of the laws 
are vigorously enforced. Most states rely on voluntary compliance resulting from social pressure and 
general "good citizenship". 
15 In the 1960's, the principal concern was paternalistic in nature: protecting smokers from their own bad 
habits. 
16 If one separates out the six other states which account for almost all tobacco production not attributable 
to the "big six" states, the percentage rises to 82%. Indiana and Wisconsin, two of the "little six" (the 
others being Florida, Maryland, Ohio and Connecticut), had no relevant laws on the books as of the end 
of 1978. 
17 The issue of nonsmokers'  rights to clean air has received its greatest national visibility, if not always 
success, through recent ballot initiatives, especially those in California and Florida's Dade County. 
18 The three-year decline coincided with the Fairness Doctrine "equal-time" anti-smoking messages 
broadcast on television and radio from 1968 through 1970. There is a fair amount of evidence causally 
linking the consumption declines to the broadcast messages (Warner, 1979). 
19 Conceptually, this ought to be empirically testable by comparing correlations reflecting different lags or 
leads. Unfortunately, the mechanism is quite complex. If both smoking and legislative behavior changes 
lag attitudinal changes, but not necessarily at the same rate, how does one interpret legislative growth 
leading corisumption decline? Is the former causing the latter or does the former lag attitudinal changes 
less long than behavioral changes? What if there is a symbiotic relationship between attitudes and 
legislation or legislation and smoking behavior? My attempts at untangling this empirically have proved 
fruitless. 
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